Chair(s): |
James CORSON, United States |
Secretary: |
Didier JACQUEMAIN (didier.jacquemain@oecd-nea.org) |
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Member(s): | All NEA member countries* | ||
Russia (Suspended*) | |||
*Russian Federation suspended pursuant to a decision of the OECD Council. | |||
Full participant(s): |
European Commission Under the NEA Statute | ||
Observer(s)(International Organisation): |
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) By agreement | ||
Date of creation: | 01 May 2022 | ||
End of mandate: | 30 April 2024 |
Mandate (Document reference):
Mandate (Document extract):
Extract from document NEA/SEN/SIN(2022)2
Mandate
Background
The knowledge base required to operate nuclear reactors safely is based on a large volume of theoretical and experimental data. This data spans the spectrum of calculated and measured fundamental physical parameters (e.g. neutronic and material properties), to data from focused experiments to investigate a limited number of phenomena, to integral tests to verify the understanding of the interaction between phenomena. The data can be used directly to establish safe operating limits for power reactors, or indirectly to create and validate models and computer codes that can predict the behaviour of a reactor in various operational states and postulated accidents. In some cases, there are validation matrices that have been developed for key phenomena with experimental datasets supporting development and validation of the associated models and computer codes. In applying datasets, it is important to understand the uncertainties associated with the measured parameters, and a key consideration for some phenomena is the physical size of an experiment to be able to account for any scaling effects.
The investment required to generate some of this data can be quite large, for example, requiring specialized equipment, highly skilled experts and/or large-scale facilities. The CSNI has taken steps to preserve the availability of key experimental facilities and associated skills through reviews of the facilities important to supporting safety of nuclear reactors and through the use of joint projects to help ensure their continued availability. The most recent review performed by the SESAR/SFEAR2 group (NEA N°7565, 2021, Nuclear Safety Research Support Facilities for Existing and Advanced Reactors, 2021 update) observed that it is also important to ensure that key datasets are preserved. This group has recommended that a cross-functional (CSNI, NSC, MBDAV) NEA expert group be established to identify key experimental data sets, and consider what should be done to preserve them based on the experience of NSC and MBDAV. This group should investigate possible options for data libraries, how to screen datasets, what information needs to accompany the primary data (domain of application, level of qualification for given applications, uncertainties, scaling…), etc. A key consideration for the group in establishing screening criteria will be the variation in priority for a dataset between different applications (e.g. use to support different computer codes). As part of its investigation, the group should recommend ways to address the proprietary aspects of experimental datasets.
The CSNI’s mandate is to support and advance the scientific and technical knowledge base for the safety of nuclear installations. In particular, the CSNI has developed through its activities a number of key experimental data sets for nuclear safety. Following the proposal of the CSNI Bureau and the recommendations from the SESAR/SFEAR2 group, the CSNI decided to formulate a Senior Expert Group on Preservation of Key Experimental Data Sets (SEGPD) at its 68th meeting held on 2-3 December 2020.
Scope
The SEGPD will focus on the preservation of data tied directly to the safety of the current operating fleet of large light water reactors. The technical disciplines evaluated will include thermal-hydraulics, neutronics, fuel, severe accidents and structural materials. The focus will be on in-reactor safety, but front- and back-end datasets may also be of interest.
In the past, there have been efforts to capture data from key nuclear safety research and existing mandates to transfer data to the NEA Data Bank at the end of NEA joint projects. However, despite some successes, there is consensus that there are still some key datasets or elements of key datasets at risk of being lost. These datasets should be identified and a means to prevent their loss should be defined.
The work to prevent these losses will be resource intensive and therefore there is a need to prioritize the work in some way. A defense of the resource expenditure must be clearly articulated.
To ensure the same issues do not occur in the future, there are some common, generically applicable best practices and lessons learned from successful efforts that should be captured and disseminated.
Objectives
The SEGPD will:
Working Methods
The mode of operation of the SEGPD is based on regular plenary meetings.
A Bureau including the Chair will lead and organise the work of the SEGPD with the support of SEGPD members.
The SEGPD will co-operate with other NEA bodies, in particular, with the NSC and MBDAV, to ensure efficient collaboration, coordination and exchange on their respective work on key nuclear data sets preservation.
The SEGPD will report to the CSNI Programme Review Group (CSNI PRG) at its meetings, to CSNI at its plenary meetings, and to the NSC and MBDAV (with the agreement of both committees).
Additionally, the SEGPD: (i) will identify resources and schedules for its activities; (ii) will form task teams to work on specific projects and to organise workshops, as appropriate; and (iii) will annually review its work programme and the effectiveness of the programme.
Membership
The SEGPD will comprise nuclear safety experts from CSNI and experts from NSC and MBDAV involved in key data sets preservation. Overall, the group should have a good understanding of nuclear safety research needs.
Interactions
The SEGPD will interact with the CSNI working groups, particularly for working group tasks related to key nuclear safety data sets preservations.
The SEGPD will interact with NSC and MBDAV and invite, when appropriate, NEA/SCI and NEA Data Bank staff in charge of preservation and distribution of key data sets.
Deliverables
The deliverables of the CSNI and its working groups are technical reports, proceedings of seminars or workshops, final summary reports from joint projects, state-of-the-art reports, and technical or collective opinion papers.
The output from the SEGPD should be a report for the CSNI, shared with the NSC and MBDAV, with recommendations for how to preserve key datasets, providing guidance on:
The report should also: