Nuclear Safety Publications
Alphabetical list of titles
Detailed publication list
Five Years after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident
Nuclear Safety Improvements and Lessons Learnt
English, 76 pages, published: 02/29/16
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/pubs/2016/7284-five-years-fukushima.pdf
- English: Five Years after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident (Executive summary)
- Japanese: 福島第一原子力発電所事故後の５年：原子力安全の改善と教訓
Countries around the world continue to implement safety improvements and corrective actions based on lessons learnt from the 11 March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. This report provides a high-level summary and update on these activities, and outlines further lessons learnt and challenges identified for future consideration. It focuses on actions taken by NEA committees and NEA member countries, and as such is complementary to reports produced by other international organisations.
It is in a spirit of openness and transparency that NEA member countries share this information to illustrate that appropriate actions are being taken to maintain and enhance the level of safety at their nuclear facilities. Nuclear power plants are safer today because of these actions. High priority follow-on items identified by NEA committees are provided to assist countries in continuously benchmarking and improving their nuclear safety practices.
Implementation of Defence in Depth at Nuclear Power Plants
Lessons Learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident
English, 45 pages, published: 01/28/16
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/pubs/2016/7248-did-npp.pdf
Defence in depth (DiD) is a concept that has been used for many years alongside tools to optimise nuclear safety in reactor design, assessment and regulation. The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident provided unique insight into nuclear safety issues and raised questions about the tools used at nuclear power plants, including the effectiveness of the DiD concept, and whether DiD can be enhanced and its implementation improved.
This regulatory guidance booklet examines and provides advice on the implementation of DiD. A key observation is that the use of the DiD concept remains valid after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Indeed, lessons learnt from the accident, and the accident?s impact on the use of DiD, have reinforced the fundamental importance of DiD in ensuring adequate safety.
This report is intended primarily for nuclear regulatory bodies, although information included herein is expected to be of interest to licensees, nuclear industry organisations and the general public.
The Safety Culture of an Effective Nuclear Regulatory Body
English, 32 pages, published: 02/04/16
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/pubs/2016/7247-scrb2016.pdf
The fundamental objective of all nuclear safety regulatory bodies is to ensure that activities related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy are carried out in a safe manner within their respective countries. In order to effectively achieve this objective, the nuclear regulatory body requires specific characteristics, one of which is a healthy safety culture.
This regulatory guidance report describes five principles that support the safety culture of an effective nuclear regulatory body. These principles concern leadership for safety, individual responsibility and accountability, co-operation and open communication, a holistic approach, and continuous improvement, learning and self-assessment.
The report also addresses some of the challenges to a regulatory body's safety culture that must be recognised, understood and overcome. It provides a unique resource to countries with existing, mature regulators and can be used for benchmarking as well as for training and developing staff. It will also be useful for new entrant countries in the process of developing and maintaining an effective nuclear safety regulator.
The Characteristics of an Effective Nuclear Regulator
English, 32 pages, published: 07/04/14
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/pubs/2014/7185-regulator.pdf
Both national and international organisations agree that the fundamental objective of all nuclear safety regulatory bodies -- the regulator's prime purpose -- is to ensure that nuclear licensees operate their facilities at all times in a safe manner. Much has been written about ways to improve regulatory processes or to improve the effectiveness of a regulatory body, including in previous OECD/NEA regulatory guidance booklets. But until now, none have focused on the characteristics of an effective nuclear safety regulator.
Effective organisations are those that have good leadership and are able to transform strategic direction into operational programmes. Effectiveness is about how well the organisation is achieving its fundamental purpose -- in the case of a nuclear safety regulator, ensuring that licensees operate their facilities and discharge their obligations in a safe manner.
This regulatory guidance booklet describes the characteristics of an effective nuclear safety regulator in terms of roles and responsibilities, principles and attributes. Each of the characteristics discussed in this report is a necessary feature of an effective nuclear safety regulator but no one characteristic is sufficient on its own. It is the combination of these characteristics that leads to the effectiveness of a nuclear regulatory body. The report provides a unique resource to countries with existing, mature regulators and can be used for benchmarking as well as training and developing staff. It will also be useful for new entrant countries in the process of developing and maintaining an effective nuclear safety regulator.
CSNI Technical Opinion Papers No. 16
Defence in Depth of Electrical Systems
English, 48 pages, published: 05/17/13
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/2013/7070-top-16.pdf
As all safety systems in the majority of existing nuclear power plants use the preferred power supply, any voltage surges in these systems could lead to common-cause failures. In the event of an unusual electrical system transient, it is essential that safety-related equipment be isolated or protected from the fault in order to ensure its ability to safely shut down the reactor and remove decay heat.
Based on the analysis of the voltage surges observed at Forsmark-1 in 2006 and Olkiluoto-1 in 2008, this technical opinion paper summarises the current state of knowledge of in-plant and external grid-related challenges to nuclear power plant safety-related electrical equipment. It will be of particular interest to nuclear safety regulators, nuclear power plant operators and grid system regulators and operators.
Crisis Communication: Facing the Challenges - Proceedings
Workshop Proceedings, Madrid, Spain, 9-10 May 2012
English, 240 pages, published: 05/06/13
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/2013/7067-crisis-communication.pdf
As manifested by an increasingly globalised media, a nuclear accident anywhere quickly becomes a potential concern for people everywhere. It is therefore of prime importance that nuclear regulators’ communication strategies take into consideration the expectations and concerns of the public and provide sound information not only for the people of the affected country, but also for citizens worldwide. Public trust is a key element in being able to do so effectively and of particular importance when there are consequences for people or the environment. International co-operation can play a fundamental role in helping to improve crisis communication on national and global scales in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. These proceedings contain the papers, recommendations and conclusions of the workshop, which was attended by over 180 experts from 27 countries and 6 international organisations.
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: OECD/NEA Nuclear Safety Response and Lessons Learnt
English, 68 pages, published: 09/10/13
Volume of the series:
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/pub/2013/7161-fukushima2013.pdf
- Japanese: 福島第一原子力発電所事故
This report outlines the response of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and its member countries to the March 2011 accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. All NEA members took early action to ensure and confirm the continued safety of their nuclear power plants and the protection of the public. Consistent with its objective of maintaining and further developing the scientific, technological and legal bases for safe nuclear energy, the NEA has assisted its member countries in their individual and collective responses to the accident. It has also provided direct assistance to the relevant authorities in Japan. These actions are summarised in the report along with lessons learnt thus far. Key messages are offered as a means to help strengthen the basis for nuclear safety and its implementation in all countries using nuclear power.
CSNI Technical Opinion Papers No. 15
Ageing Management of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
English, 40 pages, published: 12/31/12
NEA#6990, ISBN: 978-92-64-99181-1
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/2012/6990-top-15.pdf
- Français: Avis techniques du CSIN n° 15
Managing the ageing of fuel cycle facilities (FCFs) means, as for other nuclear installations, ensuring the availability of required safety functions throughout their service life while taking into account the changes that occur with time and use. This technical opinion paper identifies a set of good practices by benchmarking strategies and good practices on coping with physical ageing and obsolescence from the facility design stage until decommissioning. It should be of particular interest to nuclear safety regulators, fuel cycle facilities operators and fuel cycle researchers.
Nuclear Power Plant Operating Experience
from the IAEA/NEA International Reporting System for Operating Experience:
English, 60 pages, published: 12/31/12
NEA#7120, ISBN: 978-92-64-99193-4
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/2012/7120-iaea-nea-irs-2009-2011.pdf
The application of lessons learnt from the International Reporting System for Operating Experience (IRS) is an essential element for enhancing the safe operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) throughout the world. The IRS provides a mechanism for the exchange of information related to the incident, actions taken, root cause analysis and lessons learnt. This feedback on how to adequately remedy, or avoid, possible challenges and precursors is of paramount importance to operational safety. The IRS improves international awareness of potential challenges, actual incidents and “precursors” in NPP operations. The heightened awareness generated by feedback from operating experience has resulted in numerous improvements to equipment, procedures and training in many NPPs. The application of operational feedback also benefits the design of the next generation of NPPs. Operating experience has demonstrated that design modification issues documented in IRS reports can have a significant impact on safety. The IRS is jointly operated and managed by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).