Nuclear Safety Publications
Alphabetical list of titles
Detailed publication list
Five Years after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident
Nuclear Safety Improvements and Lessons Learnt
English, 76 pages, published: 02/29/16
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/pubs/2016/7284-five-years-fukushima.pdf
- English: Five Years after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident (Executive summary)
- Japanese: 福島第一原子力発電所事故後の５年：原子力安全の改善と教訓
Countries around the world continue to implement safety improvements and corrective actions based on lessons learnt from the 11 March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. This report provides a high-level summary and update on these activities, and outlines further lessons learnt and challenges identified for future consideration. It focuses on actions taken by NEA committees and NEA member countries, and as such is complementary to reports produced by other international organisations.
It is in a spirit of openness and transparency that NEA member countries share this information to illustrate that appropriate actions are being taken to maintain and enhance the level of safety at their nuclear facilities. Nuclear power plants are safer today because of these actions. High priority follow-on items identified by NEA committees are provided to assist countries in continuously benchmarking and improving their nuclear safety practices.
Implementation of Defence in Depth at Nuclear Power Plants
Lessons Learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident
English, 45 pages, published: 01/28/16
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/pubs/2016/7248-did-npp.pdf
Defence in depth (DiD) is a concept that has been used for many years alongside tools to optimise nuclear safety in reactor design, assessment and regulation. The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident provided unique insight into nuclear safety issues and raised questions about the tools used at nuclear power plants, including the effectiveness of the DiD concept, and whether DiD can be enhanced and its implementation improved.
This regulatory guidance booklet examines and provides advice on the implementation of DiD. A key observation is that the use of the DiD concept remains valid after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Indeed, lessons learnt from the accident, and the accident?s impact on the use of DiD, have reinforced the fundamental importance of DiD in ensuring adequate safety.
This report is intended primarily for nuclear regulatory bodies, although information included herein is expected to be of interest to licensees, nuclear industry organisations and the general public.
The Safety Culture of an Effective Nuclear Regulatory Body
English, 32 pages, published: 02/04/16
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/pubs/2016/7247-scrb2016.pdf
The fundamental objective of all nuclear safety regulatory bodies is to ensure that activities related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy are carried out in a safe manner within their respective countries. In order to effectively achieve this objective, the nuclear regulatory body requires specific characteristics, one of which is a healthy safety culture.
This regulatory guidance report describes five principles that support the safety culture of an effective nuclear regulatory body. These principles concern leadership for safety, individual responsibility and accountability, co-operation and open communication, a holistic approach, and continuous improvement, learning and self-assessment.
The report also addresses some of the challenges to a regulatory body's safety culture that must be recognised, understood and overcome. It provides a unique resource to countries with existing, mature regulators and can be used for benchmarking as well as for training and developing staff. It will also be useful for new entrant countries in the process of developing and maintaining an effective nuclear safety regulator.
The Characteristics of an Effective Nuclear Regulator
English, 32 pages, published: 07/04/14
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/pubs/2014/7185-regulator.pdf
Both national and international organisations agree that the fundamental objective of all nuclear safety regulatory bodies -- the regulator's prime purpose -- is to ensure that nuclear licensees operate their facilities at all times in a safe manner. Much has been written about ways to improve regulatory processes or to improve the effectiveness of a regulatory body, including in previous OECD/NEA regulatory guidance booklets. But until now, none have focused on the characteristics of an effective nuclear safety regulator.
Effective organisations are those that have good leadership and are able to transform strategic direction into operational programmes. Effectiveness is about how well the organisation is achieving its fundamental purpose -- in the case of a nuclear safety regulator, ensuring that licensees operate their facilities and discharge their obligations in a safe manner.
This regulatory guidance booklet describes the characteristics of an effective nuclear safety regulator in terms of roles and responsibilities, principles and attributes. Each of the characteristics discussed in this report is a necessary feature of an effective nuclear safety regulator but no one characteristic is sufficient on its own. It is the combination of these characteristics that leads to the effectiveness of a nuclear regulatory body. The report provides a unique resource to countries with existing, mature regulators and can be used for benchmarking as well as training and developing staff. It will also be useful for new entrant countries in the process of developing and maintaining an effective nuclear safety regulator.
CSNI Technical Opinion Papers No. 16
Defence in Depth of Electrical Systems
English, 48 pages, published: 05/17/13
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/2013/7070-top-16.pdf
As all safety systems in the majority of existing nuclear power plants use the preferred power supply, any voltage surges in these systems could lead to common-cause failures. In the event of an unusual electrical system transient, it is essential that safety-related equipment be isolated or protected from the fault in order to ensure its ability to safely shut down the reactor and remove decay heat.
Based on the analysis of the voltage surges observed at Forsmark-1 in 2006 and Olkiluoto-1 in 2008, this technical opinion paper summarises the current state of knowledge of in-plant and external grid-related challenges to nuclear power plant safety-related electrical equipment. It will be of particular interest to nuclear safety regulators, nuclear power plant operators and grid system regulators and operators.
Crisis Communication: Facing the Challenges - Proceedings
Workshop Proceedings, Madrid, Spain, 9-10 May 2012
English, 240 pages, published: 05/06/13
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/2013/7067-crisis-communication.pdf
As manifested by an increasingly globalised media, a nuclear accident anywhere quickly becomes a potential concern for people everywhere. It is therefore of prime importance that nuclear regulators’ communication strategies take into consideration the expectations and concerns of the public and provide sound information not only for the people of the affected country, but also for citizens worldwide. Public trust is a key element in being able to do so effectively and of particular importance when there are consequences for people or the environment. International co-operation can play a fundamental role in helping to improve crisis communication on national and global scales in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. These proceedings contain the papers, recommendations and conclusions of the workshop, which was attended by over 180 experts from 27 countries and 6 international organisations.
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: OECD/NEA Nuclear Safety Response and Lessons Learnt
English, 68 pages, published: 09/10/13
Volume of the series:
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/pub/2013/7161-fukushima2013.pdf
- Japanese: 福島第一原子力発電所事故
This report outlines the response of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and its member countries to the March 2011 accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. All NEA members took early action to ensure and confirm the continued safety of their nuclear power plants and the protection of the public. Consistent with its objective of maintaining and further developing the scientific, technological and legal bases for safe nuclear energy, the NEA has assisted its member countries in their individual and collective responses to the accident. It has also provided direct assistance to the relevant authorities in Japan. These actions are summarised in the report along with lessons learnt thus far. Key messages are offered as a means to help strengthen the basis for nuclear safety and its implementation in all countries using nuclear power.
CSNI Technical Opinion Papers No. 14
Nuclear Licensee Organisational Structures, Resources and Competencies: Determining Their Suitability
English, 16 pages, published: 05/15/12
NEA#6912, ISBN: 978-92-64-99175-0
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/2011/csni-r2011-13.pdf
- Français: Avis techniques du CSIN n° 14
The way in which nuclear licensees’ organisations are structured and resourced clearly has a potential impact on nuclear safety. As experience has continually demonstrated, operating organisations with a strong training programme for personnel, adequate resourcing and overall effective leadership and management perform more effectively in times of crisis than those lacking in one or more of these areas. In parallel, the nuclear industry is developing new resource deployment strategies which are making increased use of contractors and leading to changes in organisational structure, which in turn create challenges for the continued safe operation of nuclear facilities. This technical opinion paper represents the consensus among human and organisational factor specialists in NEA member and associated countries on the methods, approaches and good practices to be followed in designing an organisation with a strong safety focus while meeting business needs. It also considers some of the attributes that an organisation which is effectively managing its resources and capabilities might demonstrate.
CSNI Technical Opinion Papers No. 15
Ageing Management of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
English, 40 pages, published: 12/31/12
NEA#6990, ISBN: 978-92-64-99181-1
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/2012/6990-top-15.pdf
- Français: Avis techniques du CSIN n° 15
Managing the ageing of fuel cycle facilities (FCFs) means, as for other nuclear installations, ensuring the availability of required safety functions throughout their service life while taking into account the changes that occur with time and use. This technical opinion paper identifies a set of good practices by benchmarking strategies and good practices on coping with physical ageing and obsolescence from the facility design stage until decommissioning. It should be of particular interest to nuclear safety regulators, fuel cycle facilities operators and fuel cycle researchers.
Challenges in Long-term Operation of Nuclear Power Plants
Implications for Regulatory Bodies
English, 32 pages, published: 09/21/12
NEA#7074, ISBN: 978-92-64-99187-3
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/2012/cnra-r2012-5.pdf
- Français: Défis de l'exploitation à long terme des centrales nucléaires
Nuclear power reactors have become a major source of electricity supply in many countries and, based on the experience of safe and reliable operation, many operators have sought and received authorisation for long-term operation beyond the period assumed in the plant’s design. Acceptance of a nuclear power plant for long-term operation must be based on evidence that the plant will operate safely over the extended period of service. This requires an assessment of the current and projected condition of the plant and, in particular, of the systems that perform fundamental safety functions, to ensure that these systems will continue to perform their safety functions during the extended operating period. Programmes for long-term operation must be informed by operating experience and must also consider and assess environmental impacts.
This guidance document is intended to assist regulatory organisations in assessing and approving the long-term operation safety assessments submitted by operators. It outlines the fundamental principles that should govern decisions on authorisation for long-term operation. It also describes regulatory challenges and considerations that may arise in an assessment of a plant for long-term operation.
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) for Nuclear Reactor Safety Applications
Workshop Proceedings, CFD4NRS-3, Bethesda, Maryland, USA, 14-16 September 2010
English, published: 03/22/12
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/csni/cfd/workshops/CFD4NRS-3/
Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) is increasingly being adopted in nuclear reactor safety (NRS) analyses as a tool which enables a better description of specific safety-relevant phenomena occurring in nuclear reactors. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) has in recent years conducted important activities in the CFD area, including the organisation of three workshops. The CFD4NRS-3 workshop was the third in the series and was held in Bethesda, Maryland, USA on 14-16 September 2010. A total of 200 experts participated. These proceedings contain the 4 keynote lectures, including the synthesis of results for the Tee-junction Benchmark, and the 57 technical papers presented at the workshop.
Main Benefits from 30 Years of Joint Projects in Nuclear Safety
English, 132 pages, published: 05/04/12
NEA#7073, ISBN: 978-92-64-99171-2
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/reports/2012/nea7073-30-years-joint-safety-projects.pdf
One of the major achievements of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is the knowledge it has helped to generate through the organisation of joint international research projects. Such projects, primarily in the areas of nuclear safety and radioactive waste management, enable interested countries, on a cost-sharing basis, to pursue research or the sharing of data with respect to particular areas or issues. Over the years, more than 30 joint projects have been conducted with wide participation of member countries.
The purpose of this report is to describe the achievements of the OECD/NEA joint projects on nuclear safety research that have been carried out over the past three decades, with a particular focus on thermal-hydraulics, fuel behaviour and severe accidents. It shows that the resolution of specific safety issues in these areas has greatly benefited from the joint projects’ activities and results. It also highlights the added value of international co-operation for maintaining unique experimental infrastructure, preserving skills and generating new knowledge.
Nuclear Fuel Safety Criteria Technical Review
English, 80 pages, published: 09/14/12
NEA#7072, ISBN: 978-92-64-99178-1
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/reports/2012/nea7072-fuel-safety-criteria.pdf
Most of the current nuclear fuel safety criteria were established during the 1960s and early 1970s. Although these criteria were validated against experiments with fuel designs available at that time, a number of tests were based on unirradiated fuels. Additional verification was performed as these designs evolved, but mostly with the aim of showing that the new designs adequately complied with existing criteria, and not to establish new limits.
In 1996, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) reviewed existing fuel safety criteria, focusing on new fuel and core designs, new cladding materials and industry manufacturing processes. The results were published in the Nuclear Fuel Safety Criteria Technical Review of 2001. The NEA has since re-examined the criteria. A brief description of each criterion and its rationale are presented in this second edition, which will be of interest to both regulators and industry (fuel vendors, utilities).
Nuclear Power Plant Operating Experience
from the IAEA/NEA International Reporting System for Operating Experience:
English, 60 pages, published: 12/31/12
NEA#7120, ISBN: 978-92-64-99193-4
Available online at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/2012/7120-iaea-nea-irs-2009-2011.pdf
The application of lessons learnt from the International Reporting System for Operating Experience (IRS) is an essential element for enhancing the safe operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) throughout the world. The IRS provides a mechanism for the exchange of information related to the incident, actions taken, root cause analysis and lessons learnt. This feedback on how to adequately remedy, or avoid, possible challenges and precursors is of paramount importance to operational safety. The IRS improves international awareness of potential challenges, actual incidents and “precursors” in NPP operations. The heightened awareness generated by feedback from operating experience has resulted in numerous improvements to equipment, procedures and training in many NPPs. The application of operational feedback also benefits the design of the next generation of NPPs. Operating experience has demonstrated that design modification issues documented in IRS reports can have a significant impact on safety. The IRS is jointly operated and managed by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).