

OECD Workshop on Crisis Communication
Session 2: Presentation by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)

NISA's Lessons Learned from the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations

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1. Overview of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

Occurrence of the Nuclear Emergency

	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 3	Unit 4	Unit 5	Unit 6	
March 11	Earthquake Occurrence (14:46)						
	Automatic shutdown (14:47)			(Under periodic inspection)			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Emergency DG activated (both DGs) (14:47) ○ Emergency condenser activated (14:52) ○ PCV spray system activated (15:07, 15:10) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Emergency DG activated (both DGs) (14:48) ○ Reactor core isolation cooling system activated (14:50) ○ Safety relief valves actuated (14:52) ○ Residual heat removal system pumps activated (around 15:00) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Emergency DG activated (both DGs) (14:48) ○ Reactor core isolation cooling system activated (15:05, 16:03) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Emergency DG activated (1 DG, other DG under inspection) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Emergency DG activated (both DGs) (14:48, 14:49) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Emergency DG activated (all 3 DGs) (14:48 (1 DG), 14:49 (2 DGs)) 	<div style="border: 1px solid blue; padding: 5px;"> <p style="text-align: center; margin: 0;">Emergency equipment actuated normally</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Automatic insertion of control rods (reactor shutdown) - Loss of external power supply - Emergency power generator activated (securing power supply) - Emergency cooling systems actuated </div>
First tsunami wave hits [height 4m] (15:27), second tsunami wave hits [inundation height 15m] (15:35)							
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Confirmed loss of all AC power supply (15:37) (Due to the tsunami, the seawater cooling system, switchboards and other power supply systems submerged, and also the emergency DGs lost functions) 				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Power supply from emergency DG of unit 6 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Emergency DG (air cooling type) continued operation 	<div style="border: 1px solid red; padding: 5px;"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Emergency power generators stopped (loss of power supply) - Emergency cooling systems stopped Reactor water levels fell Reactor core exposed Reactor core damaged </div>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ All emergency cooling equipments stopped ○ Water levels in the reactors fell ○ Reactor core damage and melt started ○ Hydrogen explosions in reactor buildings 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Explosion in reactor building 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Cold shutdown of reactors 			
March 12 and later							

1. Overview of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

Response to the Accident (On-site)

- Response to the state of nuclear emergency (March 11)
 - At 19:03 on the same day, the Prime Minister declared the state of nuclear emergency and set up Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters lead by the Prime Minister and Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters.
- Setup of information sharing system between the government and the nuclear operator (March 15)
 - Establishment of Integrated Headquarters for the Response to the Incident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (renamed to "Government-TEPCO Integrated Response Office" on May 9).
- Announcement and promotion of the "Roadmap towards Settlement of the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, TEPCO" (April 17)
 - Step 1 (Achievement date: around three months after the announcement)
Target: steady decline of the radiation dose
 - Step 2 (Achievement date: around three to six months after the completion of step 1)
Target: release of radioactive materials is under control and the radiation dose is being held down significantly

1. Overview of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

Response to the Accident (On-site)

- Completion of Step 1 (July 19)
 - Confirmed the achievement of a “steady decline of the radiation dose”

- Completion of Step 2 (December 16)
 - Judged that the reactors reached a stable state such as “a condition equivalent to cold shutdown” and that the accident itself in the power station was brought under control.

- Promotion of mid-and-long-term measures
 - After the completion of Step 2, the government and TEPCO established the “Mid-and-long-Term Roadmap towards the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4, TEPCO” to promote mid-and-long-term measures.

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1. Overview of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

Response to the Accident (Off-site)

March 11**Directives of an “evacuation zone” and an “indoor sheltering zone”**

Directed an area within a radius of 3 km from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS as an evacuation zone, and an area within 3 to 10 km from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS as an indoor sheltering zone.

March 12**Expansion of the “evacuation zone”**


Expanded the evacuation zone to a radius of 20 km due to the development of the situation.

March 15**Expansion of the “indoor sheltering zone”**

Expanded the indoor sheltering zone adding an area of a radius between 20 and 30 km.

April 22**Directives of “planned evacuation zones” and “emergency evacuation preparation zones”**

Planned evacuation zone: zones where the accumulated radiation dose within one year from the occurrence of the accident may reach 20 mSv
 Emergency evacuation preparation zone: the zones of the “indoor sheltering zone” that do not correspond to a “planned evacuation zone.”



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2. Implementation of Public Hearings/Public Relations Regarding This Accident


Structure for Public Hearings/Public Relations by Government-Related Organizations etc.

Since this accident was a complex emergency including not only a natural disaster (earthquake, tsunami) but also nuclear accidents caused by the disaster and also the disaster became large-scaled and long-term, it was impossible for NISA to respond by itself and it became necessary to respond by the entire government.

- Provisions of information related to plants
 - Press conferences by the Chief Cabinet Secretary
 - Briefings by the NISA spokesperson
 - Press conferences by TEPCO
- Other provisions of information
 - Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (environmental monitoring)
 - Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (impact of radioactive materials on food)
 - Provision of information to overseas: carried out by the cooperation of various ministries and government agencies on the initiatives of the prime minister's office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Joint press conferences organized by the Integrated Headquarters for the Response to the Incident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations
- Response to inquiries from the general public, and provision of information to the regions concerned
- Provisions of information to the emergency-affected region
 - Nuclear Sufferers Life Support Team (release of newsletters, radio broadcasts etc.)
 - Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (release of newsletters, organization of briefings etc.)

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Nuclear Emergency Response Organizations




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2. Implementation of Public Hearings/Public Relations Regarding This Accident

Public Hearings/Public Relations Activities by NISA as the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters Secretariat

- (1) Provisions of information for the entire nation
 - 1) Provision of information by means of PR materials
 - 2) Briefings of news related persons and response to inquiries news related persons
 - 3) Participation in joint press conferences held by the Government-TEPCO Integrated Response Office
 - 4) Press conferences by the Director-General of NISA
 - 5) Provision of information on the website
 - 6) Provision of information on “Mobile NISA”



○ Screen showing an email from Mobile NISA that was actually distributed to mobile phones

(2) Response to inquiries from all of Japan

Telephone consultations at a call center

Set up dedicated lines for telephone consultation immediately after the accident to respond to inquiries from the general public.

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2. Implementation of Public Hearings/Public Relations Regarding This Accident

Briefings Organized by the Public Relations Team of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters Secretariat

First 24 hours after the earthquake occurrence

- Immediately after the earthquake occurrence, Mobile NISA sent out a first report, and a first briefing was held. 13 additional briefings were held during the first 24 hours after the earthquake occurrence.

2nd day to 1 week later

- Though the frequency of the briefings decreased temporarily due to some confusion about how information should be shared with the prime minister's office and the confusion following the occurrence of the hydrogen explosions, the briefings were held continuously at around two or three times a day.

After around the end of March 2011

- Regular briefings around twice a day also on holidays. (Additional briefings as necessary when troubles occurred.)
- Started joint press conferences by the Integrated Headquarters for the Response to the Incident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations from April 25.

From the end of Step 1 to the end of Step 2

- After the completion of Step 1 on July 19, joint press conferences were held twice a week, and briefings organized by the Public Relations Team of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters Secretariat were held once each a day from Mondays to Saturdays.

After the end of Step 2

- Joint press conferences ended with the completion of Step 2 on December 16. Since that time, each institution holds briefings and the like individually.
- The Public Relations Team of the secretariat has been holding briefings twice a week since the completion of Step 2 so far.
- Number of briefings held since the accident up to the present (as of the end of March 2012) is 390 times.

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2. Implementation of Public Hearings/Public Relations Regarding This Accident

Characteristics of the News Related Persons Briefings of the Public Relations Team of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters Secretariat

- For a while after the accident, the briefings were broadcasted live over television.
- Moreover, the participants included not only major news media but also internet media and so-called freelance media which watched from a perspective that was different from that of the major media. The internet media streamed the briefings in real time and continuously without breaks. Moreover, since the videos were saved on the internet, they are available to be viewed for anyone at any desired time.
- In these briefings, Q&A was continued basically until questions have run out.

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2. Implementation of Public Hearings/Public Relations Regarding This Accident

Response to Inquiries From All of Japan

- Immediately after the earthquake, there were many inquiries concerning the situation of the accident, the outlook for the future, the necessity for evacuation, attention points when sheltering indoors, and the impact of radiation. After approximately 10 days later, there were many inquiries related to the safety of food and drinking water, as well as to the impact on the health of babies and small children.
- The number of inquiries was approximately 4700 in May and 3800 in June, in other words, approximately 100 to 150 inquiries per a day. As for the content of these inquiries, questions regarding the situation of the accident and prospects for the future, as well as the impact on health were consistently dominant.
- The number of inquiries during August was approximately 2400, which halved compared to those in May. The inquiries not only related to future response but also included complaints against NISA.
- The number of inquiries during December was approximately 1200, which halved again compared to those in August. The inquiries frequently related to measures for the future.

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2. Implementation of Public Hearings/Public Relations Regarding This Accident

Public Hearings/Public Relations in the Emergency-Affected Region – 1)

- (1) Provisions of information nestling to the emergency sufferers and the emergency-affected region
 - 1) Local media response
 - Briefings of news related persons and response to inquiries from news related persons
 - 2) Efforts for the residents of the emergency-affected region
 - i) Newsletter from the Local Response Headquarters
 - ii) Radio broadcasts
 - iii) Life Support Communication, Fureai("Contact" in Japanese) Newsletter
 - iv) Fukushima Prefecture Women's Press Round-Table Talk
- (2) Public hearings from the residents of the emergency-affected region
 - 1) Centralized(One-stop) consultation contact
 - 2) Briefings by the Local Response Headquarters
 - 3) Individual consultation events

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2. Implementation of Public Hearings/Public Relations Regarding This Accident

Public Relations with the International Society

- (1) Communication with international organisations including the IAEA and the OECD/NEA
 - 1) Provision of information on the basis of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
 - 2) Explanations on various international conferences
 - 3) Response to false rumors
- (2) Communication with overseas governments etc.
 - 1) Briefings for diplomatic corps in Tokyo
 - 2) Emergency simultaneous notification
 - 3) Response to false rumors
- (3) Communication with overseas media and residents with non-Japanese native languages
 - 1) Joint press conferences for overseas media by the relevant ministries and government agencies
 - 2) Posting of related information in English, Chinese and Korean language on the websites of the relevant ministries and agencies etc.
- (4) NISA's internal efforts
 - 1) English translation and distribution of regular "seismic damage information."
 - 2) English translation and distribution of materials announced in an emergency


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3. Evaluation of Public Hearings/Public Relations of NISA (or the Government)

Nationwide Questionnaire – 1)

1 Information needed after the nuclear emergency and sources of such information

- In the initial period, the need for information on the “status of the accident” and the “emission status of radioactive materials” was high both nationwide and in the B-block including the emergency-affected region. In the B-block, the necessary information next to them was information pertaining to the “safety of residential areas.”
- Thereafter, while the need for information on the “emission status of radioactive materials” and the “status of the accident” continued to be high, the need for “predictions on the development of the accident and prospects for settlement”, “radiation dose and its impact on health” as well as “safety of food and drinking water etc.” increased compared to the initial period both nationwide and in the B-block.



Note: Internet questionnaire conducted on a nationwide basis (3,345 respondents)

3. Evaluation of Public Hearings/Public Relations of NISA (or the Government)

Nationwide Questionnaire – 2)

1) Information needed after the nuclear emergency and sources of such information (continued)

- As regards information needed during the initial period, more than half of the replies both on a nationwide and on the B-block level said that they were not satisfied. The percentage of persons who were not satisfied is particularly high in the B-block with 74%. Frequent reasons given for this were “because there was no detailed information,” “because the grounds and reasons for the information were unclear” and “because there was little information.”
- As the means for obtaining information during the initial period, television stood out both on a nationwide basis and in the B-block and exceeded 90% on a nationwide level. The internet exceeded 35%. Meanwhile, in the B-block, almost half of the replies said that they had been unable to watch television.

With regard to where information was obtained from, the most frequent replies both on a nationwide basis and in the B-block were “journalists and commentators of TV stations, radio stations, newspaper companies, magazines and other news media.” Frequent reasons given for this were “because they showed assessments and opinions based on expert knowledge” and “because I felt that they showed fair and neutral assessments and opinions.”

With regard to the most trusted institute as an information source, frequent replies were “journalists and commentators of TV stations, radio stations, newspaper companies, magazines and other news media”(41%), “experts”(32%) and “information obtained from internet” (24%). Meanwhile, NISA was replied by 10% on a nationwide.

3. Evaluation of Public Hearings/Public Relations of NISA (or the Government)

Nationwide Questionnaire – 3)

2) Public hearings/public relations activities carried out by NISA etc. during the nuclear emergency**Briefings**

75% of the respondents said that they had seen the NISA briefings. However, many of these respondents pointed out issues, with the most frequently mentioned reason being "the grounds and reasons for the assessments and opinions etc. were not clearly shown" (61%), followed by "could not feel an attitude trying to publish information in a proactive way" (56%). The same kind of comments were given for the joint press conferences held by the Government-TEPCO Integrated Response Office.

Website

The most respondents replied that they "have not seen the website" (74%). Further, among those who had seen the website, many pointed out issues, particularly most frequent issue was that they "felt that not all information was being published" (64%).

"Mobile NISA"

Most of the respondents (93%) said that they "do not know" Mobile NISA.

Telephone Consultation Contact

Most of the respondents (99%) said that they "have never used" this contact.

Centralized information of the public by the national government in emergencies

Replies included both those saying that public information should be centralized, and those saying that each institution should communicate information at its own responsibility.

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3. Evaluation of Public Hearings/Public Relations of NISA (or the Government)

Nationwide Questionnaire – 4)

3) Opinions on public hearings/public relations activities by regulatory bodies in the future

Replies included mainly the following. Opinions demanding information to be disclosed without being hidden were particularly frequent.

- Do not hide information (facts), handle information openly, make information available to the public
- Explain in an easily comprehensible way without using much specialized terminology
- Provide information quickly
- Provide accurate information
- Feel responsible and clarify where the responsibility lies
- Stand in the position of the general public and view through the eyes of the general public (provide the information that the general public needs)
- Centralize the communication of information
- Respond with good faith

Further, even if small in number, there were also the following opinions.

- Invite opinions via the website
- First communicate the truth on the current situation and the like, then give instructions on how to deal with it in a calm way
- Create a website where information and questions everyone wants to know can be seen at one glance
- Communicate in such a manner that citizens can easily participate
- Take in opinions from outside
- Provide information accurately and in an easily comprehensible way even if the information is bad news
- Indicate the grounds for why something is safe
- Centralize the relevant organizations and collaborate
- Inform the region where an NPS is located about the response when there will be troubles
- Consider how drills and emergency organizations should look like, utilizing the lessons learned from the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS
- Exert a strong leadership and show a clear vision to the people

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3. Evaluation of Public Hearings/Public Relations of NISA (or the Government)

External Interviews (Environmental NPOs in the Metropolitan Area etc., Residents of the Regions Concerned)

- Regarding the disclosure of information, we think that the current situation of people saying that information was hidden is due to the fact that the occasion to provide was missed even in the phase where the assessment was settled, for example, SPEEDI information.
- There was a need for information teaching how one should act if there are reports that radioactive materials were detected, or for information on prospects for the future, rather than information on the situation at the plant.
- What should be resolved is not only problems of the public hearings/public relations by regulatory bodies. Before talking about these problems, there are various other problems to be considered regarding the emergency preparedness system.
- As for the communication of information through news media, one line should be created by the national government in cooperation with the news media, instead of an organization where the prime minister's office, the ministries and government agencies are separate from each other.
- As for the provision of information from the national government, not only the conclusion but also the process through which the conclusion was reached should be disclosed.

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3. Evaluation of Public Hearings/Public Relations of NISA (or the Government)

External Interviews (News Related Persons: Broadcasting Stations, Newspapers etc. - 1)

1) Comments related to emergency response

- Maybe the preparations for public relations were insufficient because of thinking that no significant accident would happen.

2) Comments related to public relations capabilities

- Expected of NISA was the provision of information based on specialized technical knowledge, but NISA was not capable of this. Further, there was no original information from NISA.
- The fact per se that the briefings for news media were broadcasted as is into the world in real time was a first, and I think that this was something unexpected. I suppose that in the future, the side that communicates information needs to consider for whom the information is intended.

3) Comments related to the provision of information

- The handouts that were distributed were easier to understand than those of TEPCO. Even without listening to the speaker, one could understand what was happening just by looking at the drawings and tables.
- Although NISA had obtained and analyzed more than the information that was announced on the press conferences etc., no information at all was provided such as predictions on how the accident would develop. Also after the initial phase, NISA just passed on information from TEPCO, which is a poor performance from the aspect of information provision. If the prospects were bad, that information and also what it meant should have been communicated.
- If there were multiple scenarios, those should have been presented. Information should have been provided for the people to be mentally prepared for how they may need to respond later on.

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External Interviews (News Related Persons : Broadcasting Stations, Newspapers etc. - 2)

3) Comments related to the provision of information (continued)

- Reviewing the requests that have been brought up from the news media side up to now, it should be considered to work together with the news media to react what they were not able to do.
- I think that it was good that NISA press conferences were continued until all questions were attended to.

4) Comments related to information needs

- Monitoring data are important, but most of this extremely important information obtained during the emergency monitoring could not be reported to the residents and was announced to the public as much as three months later. The national government did probably not share what was important and what should be communicated.
- I think the base should be that a person familiar with nuclear technology should release uncertain information, even with conditions attached.

5) Comments related to organizational aspects

- Spokespersons should include people with more authorities.
- I think that there was no one to support the spokesperson (staff to take notes, take charge and connect them to each division). It is my impression that the organization was very fragile.

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3. Evaluation of Public Hearings/Public Relations of NISA (or the Government)

External Interviews (News Related Persons : Internet Media)

- We streamed not only the press conferences, but also filmed the material that was handed out and streamed the video.
- In the case of, for example, a journalist, information could be provided on an on-the-record or off-the-record basis, but in the case of an internet live broadcast, everything is on-the-record. Explanations that are made off-the-record will not reach the viewers.
- The spokesperson used the phrase "I don't know" too often. This was a problem. The spokesperson should explain why something was not known, and to what degree something was known.
- What was good about the press conferences of NISA was that they were "open." By principle, anybody could enter.
- As communication during normal times, they should hold regular briefings or the like. I think that, if possible, this should not be limited to press clubs but made accessible on a wide basis.

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3. Evaluation of Public Hearings/Public Relations of NISA (or the Government)

External Interviews (News Related Persons : Freelance Journalists)

- The minutes of a press conference should be disclosed immediately. If possible, videos should also be disclosed. Not disclosing the minutes is necessarily perceived as if NISA hides the minutes to prevent the press conferences from being examined.
- Regarding matters such as low radiation doses that even experts have different opinions about, NISA should explain multiple opinions of key experts and explain why Japan adopts which opinion, including what is known and what is not known.
- Whether to escape or not, the numerical values and their meaning, and a wide range of scenarios based on them should be explained. Interpretations should not underestimate the situation, and the explanations should start from the information that serves as the base for the assessment of NISA with a certain width and including various possibilities. The conclusion should be explained together with the reasons why that conclusion was reached after the abovementioned explanations.
- That no spokesperson was assigned during normal times is a problem. The PR staff cannot work unless they understand what is important during communication. Thus, they need training.

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3. Evaluation of Public Hearings/Public Relations of NISA (or the Government)

External Interviews (Diplomatic Corps in Tokyo, Overseas News Related Persons)

1) Diplomatic corps in Tokyo

- We mostly checked the press releases on NISA's homepage. Basically, we referred to the releases in Japanese language. We often looked at the "new arrivals" section. The problem about the English text was that it was posted after a certain delay.
- It would be good if there was a channel for direct communication of embassies with NISA not just for cases of accidents and emergencies.

2) Overseas news related persons

- When we phoned NISA to obtain detailed information, response was slow because maybe we were non-Japanese media. This often happens in Japan.
- If there is an occasion for an exchange of opinions with the media about how information provision to the media should be like, we will participate.

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3. Evaluation of Public Hearings/Public Relations of NISA (or the Government)

External Interviews (Communication Experts)

- I feel that perceiving the problems involving the NISA response to this accident as communication problems is wrong. The reasons lie in problems related to emergency preparedness and accident response, and there are limits to an appropriate communication in such a situation.
- Rather than how information should be released, the important issue should have been how the response should look like.
- The awareness regarding what public relations by the nuclear administration in general is given for, is poor.
- SNS and Social media such as Twitter may be difficult to use in some aspects, but it is a fact that everyone looks at these information sources, and thus one should consider using them also as means for public relations in an emergency in the future.

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3. Evaluation of Public Hearings/Public Relations of NISA (or the Government)

Interviews of Staff of NISA etc. – 1)

Interviewed persons: 22 persons of staff from NISA etc. who were involved with information provision related to this accident

1) Sharing of information among staff

- The attitude of trying to obtain first-hand information by oneself was insufficient.
- The human resource assignment was insufficient throughout the entire emergency response.
- Inside the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters Secretariat, there was not sufficient awareness of "for what purpose information is shared."

2) Information provision with relevant organizations

- The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters Secretariat perceived the request for information sharing from the prime minister's office as having to obtain approval before releasing information to the press, and because of this, the information sharing with the prime minister's office was temporarily subject to some confusion. After that, information sharing functioned again.

3) Response with an awareness of the people who are the ultimate receivers of the information

- While responding to mass media all the time, it was probably sometimes forgotten that the people are the ultimate receivers of the information.

4) Response to news related persons

- Due to insufficient communication with journalists during normal times, there was no awareness of what journalists are interested in, what they are likely to ask and how NISA should reply.

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3. Evaluation of Public Hearings/Public Relations of NISA (or the Government)

Interviews of Staff of NISA etc. – 2)

5) How briefings should look like

- With the emergence of internet media, briefings started to be broadcasted in real time and entirely. These changes were not sufficiently responded to.

6) How information should be released

- It was not considered to what level and how preliminary information is to be released.
- Instructions for the collection, analysis, assessment and response to information, which is the actual role of NISA, could not be given.

7) The relationship between Tokyo and the local area

- In Tokyo, NISA was regularly announcing plant information and the like, but in most cases, that information did not reach the local region before the announcement. Therefore, information was announced in the local regions later than in Tokyo, and the support for the local public relations was insufficient.
- Breaks in the information infrastructure during the initial period and the manner in which important information such as evacuation directives was communicated are also issues in terms of emergency preparedness.
- There were problems particularly in the sense of speed and accuracy. In the background for this were organizational problems. For example, staff which had English language skills, basic knowledge of nuclear power and the capability to check terminology was limited. Around the end of March, staff could not catch up with the increasing volume of English translations and the lack of staff in international public relations had reached its limits.

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4. Rearrangement of indications obtained from Questionnaires and Interviews etc.

Rearrangement of the indications

When rearranging the content of the indications obtained from questionnaires and interviews, the issues can be categorized as shown in the table below. These four categories were further organized into sub-categories according to their content. The table below shows the categories and sub-categories of the indications.

Category	Sub-category
1. Looks as if there was no capability for response	(1) Insufficient emergency response capability (2) Insufficient public relations capability
2. Could not see an attitude of trying to proactively provide information	(1) Provision of information is slow (2) Looks as if information is hidden
3. Response to information needs is insufficient	(1) Insufficient grasping of information needs (2) Insufficient response to needs related to information contents (3) Insufficient response to needs related to the means of information provision
4. Response organization is difficult to understand	

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5. Issues to be challenged in light of Public Hearings/Public Relations Regarding This Accident

Extraction of Issues to be challenged based on indications

We analyzed what caused the indications rearranged in the previous chapter. As a result, the following four issue categories were found. Our actions to address these issues will be explained in session 6.

Category	Sub-category
1. Issues related to the accident response	[Issue 1] Problems in obtaining information [Issue 2] Problems in analyzing and assessing information [Issue 3] Problems in the reliability of the analysis and assessment results
2. Issues related to the public hearings/public relations functions	[Issue 4] Public relations strategy is unclear [Issue 5] Insufficient collaboration between the decision-making field and the public relations field [Issue 6] Insufficient collaboration between the prime minister's office and NISA's public relations [Issue 7] Problems concerning the spokesperson [Issue 8] Problems concerning the functions for supporting the spokesperson [Issue 9] Lack of human resources for international response [Issue 10] Problems concerning the handling of uncertain information [Issue 11] Problems concerning comprehensibility [Issue 12] Insufficient use of public hearings/public relations tools [Issue 13] Insufficient communication with stakeholders
3. Issues related to the sharing of information with relevant organizations	[Issue 14] Insufficient collaboration with relevant organizations
4. Issues regarding emergency preparedness response	[Issue 15] Insufficient capability to respond to events that exceed expectations

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Thank you for your attention.

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