

USNRC Actions in Response to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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
Agenda

- NRC post-Fukushima Actions
 - Regulatory Approach
 - Specific Actions Taken
 - What's Next

Near-Term Task Force

SECY-11-0093

(July 12, 2011)



- Continued operation and licensing do not pose an imminent risk to safety.
- Task Force conclusion reinforced decision that there was **no need** to shut down plants in the wake of Fukushima.

Near-Term Task Force

SECY-11-0093

(July 12, 2011)

Key Lessons Learned

- External hazard design
 - Seismic and flooding
- Prolonged loss of AC power
 - “Station Blackout” (SBO) coping
- Reliable containment venting
 - Boiling water reactors (BWRs)
- Multi-unit events
- Spent fuel pools



Near-Term Task Force

SRM-SECY-11-0093

(Aug. 19, 2011)

Commission's Big Picture Approach



- Implement certain recommendations without delay
- Integrated and prioritized assessment of other recommendations
- Senior level steering committee oversight of implementation details

Three Tiers of Prioritized Actions

- Tier 1: Actions without delay
 - Strive to complete and implement Fukushima lessons learned within 5 years – by 2016
 - Implementation should be transparent; regulatory mechanisms should be clear and specific
 - Performance-based system should be a guiding principle
- Tier 2: Further information needed, but no longer term study needed
- Tier 3: Longer term study necessary

Regulatory Standard

- Reasonable assurance of **adequate protection** of public health and safety
 - Derived from Atomic Energy Act and case law
- General principles
 - NRC has broad authority
 - Nexus to radiological health and safety
 - Objective criteria not required – case-by-case basis
 - Does NOT mean zero risk

Backfit Rule

Proposed New Requirements must be Systematically Evaluated and will not be Imposed unless:

- Needed for Adequate Protection (Cost of implementation is not considered) or
- Provide Substantial Increase in Safety with Justifiable Costs (May consider qualitative factors such as defense in depth)

Regulatory Principles and Practices

- Technical Competence
- Active Engagement with Stakeholders
- Openness and Transparency
- Independence

Tier 1 Actions

Orders (March 2012)

- EA-12-049 – Mitigating strategies beyond design basis events
- EA-12-050 – Hardened vents for Mark I and II containments
- EA-12-051 – Spent fuel pool instrumentation

Tier 1 Actions

Requests for Information (March 2012)

- Seismic and flooding walkdowns
- Seismic and flooding reevaluations
- Enhanced EP staffing and communications



Tier 1 Actions


- **Modified Order for Containment Venting Systems EA-13-109 issued June 6, 2013**
 - Supersedes Order EA-12-050
 - Severe Accident Capability
 - Phase 1 wetwell vent and Phase 2 drywell vent
- **Filtration Strategies Rulemaking**
 - In March 2013, the Commission directed the staff to initiate rulemaking for filtering strategies
 - Proposed rule scheduled for December 2015

Rulemaking Activities

- **Station Blackout (SBO) Mitigation Strategies**
 - Scope of rulemaking has expanded
 - Spent Fuel Pool instrumentation and makeup capability
 - Emergency Preparedness
 - Regulatory Basis - July 2013
 - Proposed Rule- June 2014
 - Final rule - December 2016



Post-Fukushima Safety Enhancements



What's next?

- Commission decisions pending:
 - Recommendation 1 regarding Regulatory Framework
 - Expedited transfer of spent fuel
- Implementation of Orders
- Staff review of external hazard reevaluations
- Transition activities to line organization
- Continued stakeholder engagement

Stakeholder Engagement



Fort Calhoun Extended Shutdown



Conclusions

- NRC is making considerable progress in implementing safety enhancements at U.S. plants
- No imminent risk from continued operation of U.S. nuclear power plants
- NRC lessons-learned consistent with the international community assessments
- NRC continues to evaluate additional lessons learned for applicability to U.S. plants

Thank You

Questions
Comments
Discussion