**Questionnaire C**

**The Impact on Inspection Programmes of the Fukushima Accident**

Country: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

### Notes:

Only one response per country is required. If more than one person from your country is participating, please co-ordinate the responses accordingly.

 Submittals should be sent by email to: nancy.salgado@oecd.org by Thursday, 6 February 2014

**FOREWORD:**

The Fukushima accident had a significant impact on regulatory bodies (RB). Many RB reacted to the accident by reviewing their regulatory framework, licensing requirement, and inspection programmes. The purpose of this workshop topic is to explore how the reviews led to changes in inspection programmes. The focus of this workshop topic is to identify commendable inspection practices by the RB for gaining confidence that safety will be maintained in case of severe accidents. Note that the questions are for actions and changes imposed on the licensee, and not for changes made to how the RB manages an accident.

**QUESTIONNAIRE:**

For preparation of the workshop, participants are invited to supply their national inspection approaches used according to the following questionnaire:

**1.0 NATIONAL RESPONSE**

1.1 What changes in regulations or national standards have been made or are planned that affects your inspection programme?

1.2 What are the changes at the national level for managing nuclear emergencies? How will they affect your inspection programme?

1.3 Have any changes in RB organisation been made (or planned) post Fukushima? How will these changes affect your inspection programme?

**2.0 LICENSEE EMERGENCY PROGRAMMES**

2.1 Are there any changes in the licensee’s emergency preparedness programmes? What impact will they have on your inspection programme?

2.2 Have any changes in licensee organisations been made post Fukushima?

2.3 Are there any changes in NPPs minimum complement of staff in view of the Fukushima accident?

**3.0 TECHNICAL OR ENGINEERING CHANGES TO PLANTS**

3.1 What are the changes with respect to SAMG assessments (flood, seismic levels - active and passive faults); and supporting facilities post Fukushima? Will any changes in the inspection programme be required?

3.2 Are there changes in RB inspection practices due to changes imposed by Fukushima on technical specifications, surveillance and testing of equipment & systems and maintenance programme?

3.3 What are the implications of multiunit sites on your inspection programme (such as common services)?

3.4 What are the required major modifications planned/carried out by the licensee in response to the Fukushima accident? Therefore, will any changes in the assessment and inspection by the RB be made?

3.5 What are the plans of RB to Inspect/assess plant design condition with respect to external events such as flood, cyclone, earthquake etc.?

3.6 What are the changes in emergency operating procedures such as extended station blackout etc? How will this affect the inspection programme?

**4.0 POST FUKUSHIMA INSPECTION PROGRAMME CHANGES**

4.1 Were focused inspections conducted immediately after the event? Did they result in long term changes to your inspection programme?

4.2 Are there any changes in frequency, scope, method of inspections conducted by RB post Fukushima?

**5.0 TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION**

5.1 Does RB have plans to change the training of inspectors to ensure their understanding of the design changes including equipment and associated procedures?

5.2 What are the expected changes in training of operators and RBs oversight for the training programme post Fukushima? Any impact on simulator based training and the inspection programme.

5.3 How does RB assess the competence of operators to work under stressed conditions imposed by events beyond design basis accidents?