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Country profile: Hungary

Summary figures for 2011

The following information is from the NEA publication Nuclear Energy Data, the annual compilation of official statistics and country reports on nuclear energy in OECD member countries.

Country
Number of nuclear power plants connected to the grid
Nuclear electricity generation
(net TWh) 2011
Nuclear percentage of total electricity supply
Hungary
4
14.7
 *
43.2
  
OECD Europe
135
858.4
24.7
  
Total
329
2049.5
20.7
  

* Provisional data

Country report

The Hungarian national energy strategy was adopted by the parliament in October 2011. The energy strategy gives a roadmap until 2030 and a vision to 2050. The main aim of the strategy is to ensure the optimal balance of security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability. The energy import should be decreased by diversification of resources and/or origins. The government considers energy production as a way out of the economic crisis. The main elements of the strategy include the increased use of renewables, the maintenance of nuclear capacity (lifetime extension and consideration of building new capacity), the development of regional energy infrastructure, the development of new organisational system as well as the increased effectiveness and efficiency in energy use. The national energy strategy can be found on the website of the Ministry of National Development (www.nfm.gov.hu).

The Act on Atomic Energy (Act Nr. CXVI of 1996) was modified to a great extent in 2011. The most important elements of the modification concerned the safety principles and the tasks and activity of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA). The nuclear safety codes were also modified, building in the Association of Regulators of Western Europe (WENRA) reference levels. The set of requirements was completed by two new volumes in order to define requirements for all parts of the lifetime of nuclear facilities. The new set of requirements came into force on 1 November 2011. The modified act and the new safety codes can be found on the HAEA's website (www.haea.gov.hu).

After the severe accident at Fukushima Daiichi NPP all European countries operating NPPs performed a targeted safety reassessment (TSR) - the so-called stress test - at the call of the European Council. The TSR for the Paks NPP focused on topics specified by the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG). These correspond to earthquake and/or flooding and other external natural hazard factors; to the loss of electric power supply and the loss of the ultimate heat sink or combination of these two; and to severe accident management. In relation to the hazard factors it was assessed whether the design basis of the plant was duly determined and whether there are sufficient reserves beyond design basis before severe damage can occur. Based on the final report of the Paks NPP submitted for regulatory review, the HAEA agreed with the proposed tasks in the report to be carried out in order to further improve the plant safety and identified a few additional options. Along with the detailed coverage of the topics specified by ENSREG, HAEA also established that the national legal requirements for the safety of NPPs are in line with the international standards and best practices. HAEA submitted the national report about the results of the review to the European Commission by the end of 2011 and published it on its website (www.haea.gov.hu). Based on the results of the regulatory review of the TSR, HAEA concluded that the design basis of Paks NPP is adequate and complies with the legal requirements and international practice. The safety systems and safety functions satisfy requirements of the design base. After the last periodic safety review (PSR) of Paks NPP, specific safety enhancement measures had been implemented, mainly in order to improve the beyond design basis capabilities of the plant. These measures are fully in line with expectations of the TSR. It can be concluded that Paks NPP is safe and no deficiencies have been identified that may question the adequacy of its design basis and may require any urgent regulatory intervention. The measures initiated by the last PSR also provide robust capabilities for the plant for successfully managing severe situations. In addition to the positive findings the TSR identified a number of options and measures to enhance plant safety even further. The HAEA ordered the operator of the plant to elaborate a detailed programme by the end of the first half of 2012 for realising these options.

The Paks NPP generated 15 685 GWh of electricity in 2011, which represents 43.25% of the gross domestic electricity production of Hungary. This amount was generated by four units as follows; unit 1: 3 700.3 GWh; unit 2: 4 037.2 GWh; unit 3: 3 888.8 GWh; unit 4: 4 058.7 GWh. As far as the amount of the produced energy is concerned, 2011 is considered an outstanding year, because the second largest production result was achieved in the history of the plant. The total of all electricity that has been generated by Paks NPP since the date of the first connection of unit 1 to the grid was higher than 366.8 TWh as of the end of 2011. At the end of 2008, a lifetime extension programme for the Paks NPP was submitted to the HAEA to justify the establishment of the operating conditions and safe operation beyond the designed lifetime. HAEA evaluated the programme and ordered the licensee to implement the programme with certain conditions. The technical preparation activities covered the determination of the ageing effects and ageing processes requiring treatment, the status of the systems, structures and components, the evaluation of the existing ageing management programmes, and if necessary, the amendment or development of new programmes. HAEA regularly reviews and evaluates the progress reports of the lifetime extension programme. In December 2011, in compliance with the legal requirements, the beyond designed lifetime licence application for Paks unit 1 was submitted, one year before the expiration of its licensed operating time. By the end of 2012, HAEA will have evaluated the licence application and the additional information and will make a decision on the extension.

The interim spent fuel storage facility (designed by GEC Alsthom, United Kingdom) at the Paks site is a "modular vault dry storage" type spent fuel storage facility which has been receiving irradiated fuel assemblies from the Paks NPP since 1997. The increase of storage capacity is in line with the demands of Paks NPP. The planned 37 modules are assumed to be capable of storing all spent fuel until the end of the extended service life of the plant. The extension of the storage facility with four new modules was finished at the end of 2011. At present, 20 storage modules are ready. Beginning with module 17 a square arrangement will be applied for the storage tubes instead of triangular arrangement that is used in modules 1-16; consequently 527 storage tubes can be installed instead of the original 450. When the storage facility reaches its maximum planned capacity it will be capable of storing a total of 18 267 fuel assemblies within the 37 modules.

The preparation for the construction of new power plant unit(s) at Paks NPP has been proceeding under the management of the Hungarian Power Companies Ltd. (MVM Holding), the principal owner of Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd. Although the Hungarian parliament gave its consent in principle for the preparation of possible new units on 30 March 2009 and the preparatory works (analysis of the expansion of Paks NPP, preparation for the call for tender) are being conducted by MVM Holding, the Hungarian government has not yet given its formal consent to the planned expansion. There is no decision on the type and vendor of the new reactor(s) and no tender has been issued. This is the reason why the expansion has not been taken into account in the data of this questionnaire beyond projected electricity generation and installed generation capacity.

Source: Nuclear Energy Data 2012

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Last reviewed: 7 October 2012